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Abstract
In this paper we empirically examine the key determinants of elite rivalry and identify their main
channels of transmission, thus contributing to the sparse literature on the topic. Our results clearly
indicate that the income level, human capital, the system of checks and balances, natural resources
rents, and colonization experience (or, alternatively, the identity of a country's colonizer) are strong
determinants of the observed elite rivalry levels. The determining eﬀect of the ﬁrst three factors is highly
signiﬁcant and positive, while that of the last two factors is highly signiﬁcant and negative. These results
imply that higher levels of education and income per capita and a more eﬃcient separation of powers
contribute to reduce the elite rivalry level, while past experience as a colony and higher rents from natural
resources contribute to aggravate it. As regards the transmission channels, the quantiﬁcation of eﬀects
shows that about 60% of the determining factors' overall eﬀect on elite rivalry is transmitted through the
legal system and property rights and the political risk channels, mainly coming from the income level
and natural resources rents, which cumulatively account for around 45% of the total eﬀect. In sum, our
empirical ﬁndings indicate that a more eﬃcient institutional model and speciﬁc historical and economic
factors, can in fact determine the level of elite rivalry in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Modern economic theory and empirics relate economic growth and development to inclusive economic
and political institutions. Extensive research shows that high quality institutions are one of the primary
determinants of economic prosperity and that diﬀerences in institutions are among the main causes of cross-
country diﬀerences in income and development levels (North, 1990; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Rodrik, 2000;
Acemoglu, 2006). It is not surprising thus, that the question of what determines one of the fundamentals
of long-term prosperity and development of a nation - institutions, also receives increasing attention from
social scientists. In this paper, we address this question and contribute to the literature by empirically
examining the key determining factors of a speciﬁc institutional feature, namely, elite rivalry, a relatively
under-researched topic.
Referring to the literature on institutions and on the political economy of growth, elite rivalry can be seen
to reﬂect the negative form of competition for power, which arises when the political group in power - political
elite - is more concerned with keeping control of political power for their own beneﬁt, rather than serving
the society (Sochirca & Veiga, 2017; Acemoglu, 2006). Elite rivalry can then be expected to have a negative
impact, both on institutional quality and economic performance. In particular, it can harm economic growth
and development by reducing the incentives of the political elite to implement policies promoting welfare
and growth, motivating instead the implementation of distortionary policies so as to prevent political rival
groups from rising to power.1 Several researchers have focused on the retarding eﬀects of rivalry between
the political elite and other political groups. For example, Rodrik (1999) suggests that investment and
growth opportunities can be lost in the disagreements between political groups, creating a burden of extra
costs on the economy; Acemoglu (2006) argues that the political elite's pursuit of power induces them to
choose economically ineﬃcient policies, which on its turn compromises long-term investments and leads to
poor economic performance. The negative impact of elite rivalry is then induced through constraints on the
choice and implementation of policies and the resulting ineﬃcient resource allocations, with general growth-
retarding eﬀects (see, for example, Sochirca et al., 2016; Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Lizzeri
& Persico, 2005; Dixit & Londregan, 1995). In fact, working with a panel dataset covering a large number of
countries, and using a composite indicator of elite rivalry, Sochirca & Veiga (2017) identify a highly signiﬁcant
negative impact of elite rivalry on economic growth.
Given the relevance of elite rivalry, both for the quality of institutions and for economic performance, it is
1Elite rivalry would then have the opposite impact of (positive) political competition, which is generally associated with the
implementation of growth-enhancing policies (see, for example, Besley et al., 2010 and Wittman, 1989).
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important to understand what inﬂuences the elite rivalry itself. This is the focus of the present paper. With
this objective, we will make use of the composite elite rivalry indicator constructed in Sochirca & Veiga (2017).
The authors use factor analysis to aggregate data on selected variables, the state of which could indirectly
indicate the possibility of a higher or lower elite rivalry level. Considering both the political and economic
dimensions as jointly determining the degree of rivalry between the political elite and other political groups,
the constructed composite indicator includes data on the eﬀectiveness of legislature, government eﬃciency
and responsiveness, quality of bureaucracy, general regime eﬀects, strength and integrity of the legal system
(political dimension), and also on the protection of property rights, legal enforcement of contracts, and
regulatory restrictions (economic dimension). Higher institutional quality in any of the referred dimensions
would make it more diﬃcult for the elite to appropriate or misuse resources, and thus the implied level of elite
rivalry would be lower.2 The obtained indicator was then compiled in a data set with elite rivalry levels for
124 countries between 1984-2012, which we will use in our current work to empirically assess the key factors
that determine the observed elite rivalry levels across countries, and their main channels of transmission.
Our empirical study contributes to the literature on the determinants of institutional quality,3 by focusing
on the speciﬁc institutional feature of elite rivalry. Besides employing elite rivalry as a new institutional
quality measure and covering a large sample of countries, we also consider several determinants that, although
reported important in the related literature, have not been evaluated previously. Namely, we introduce foreign
direct investments and frontier distance as potential new determining factors and ﬁnd that, while the latter
appears to have a moderate impact on the observed level of elite rivalry, the former does not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence it.
Contrarily to previous ﬁndings, our results indicate that both colonization experience and colonizer iden-
tity are signiﬁcant determinants of the level of elite rivalry, while religious fractionalization and population
density are not. We also ﬁnd that the level of development (measured by GDP per capita and human capital)
and the checks and balances system are strong and persistent determinants of the elite rivalry level. Finally,
besides identifying the factors that are signiﬁcant determinants of elite rivalry, our data allows us to also
evaluate their main channels of transmission and to quantify the individual contribution eﬀects by channel
and by factor. Regarding this, we ﬁnd that the income level, human capital, and the system of checks and
balances are the strongest determinants of elite rivalry. Additionally, the empirical results indicate that the
composite measure of the legal system integrity, protection of property rights and contract enforcement, is
2As argued in the literature, one important characteristic of elite rivalry is ineﬃcient resource use and expropriation by the
elite, which becomes more diﬃcult when institutional failures are weak (see, for example, Acemoglu, 2009).
3For previous studies of the determinants of various aspects of institutional quality, see La Porta et al. (1999), Islam &
Montenegro (2002), Hauner & Kyobe (2010), and Rodriguez & Garcimartin (2013).
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the strongest transmission channel for the determining factors' inﬂuence on the observed elite rivalry level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the determining
factors and summarizes those to be considered in our analysis; Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and
results on identifying the key determining factors and their transmission channels; Section 4 presents the
conclusions.
2 Exploring the literature: potential factors determining the level
of elite rivalry
In this section, we include a brief description of the elite rivalry indicator we will use in our empirical
study and, based on the insights from a preliminary analysis of the indicator and the related literature, we
also explore and discuss the factors that may have a determining inﬂuence on the observed level of elite
rivalry. The impact of these factors will be tested in section 3.
In this work, we employ the composite elite rivalry indicator from Sochirca & Veiga (2017), constructed
using factor analysis and including speciﬁc institutional quality aspects identiﬁed as fundamental for deﬁning
elite rivalry. In particular, the results of the data reduction exercises in Sochirca & Veiga (2017) identiﬁed
legal system and property rights, eﬀectiveness of legislature, general regime eﬀects, and political risk as in-
stitutional features that jointly represent the absolute elite rivalry level of a country, the higher being the
indicator's value, the lower the corresponding level of elite rivalry.4 The constructed composite indicator was
found to exhibit considerable variations by subgroups of countries with similar characteristics. For example,
disaggregation of the initial sample of 124 countries into subgroups by income level and geographical location
revealed that countries from the high-income and advanced economies groups exhibit the highest mean values
of the elite rivalry indicator, meaning that they have the lowest elite rivalry levels, compared to all other
groups. On the contrary, countries from the low-income and Sub-Saharan Africa groups have the highest
average levels of elite rivalry. These statistics indicate that elite rivalry is inversely related to income and
development levels, and that location can, in fact, imply signiﬁcant diﬀerences in institutional organization,
thus providing in our current research a starting point for the pre-selection of factors which may determine
the observed elite rivalry levels.
In fact, the selection of the elite rivalry determinants is a rather diﬃcult task given that: (i) both
the theoretical and empirical existing literature on elite rivalry is scarce, and our best available proxy is
4See Appendix A on the composition of the constructed elite rivalry indicator.
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institutions and institutional quality, and (ii) related research commonly studies the eﬀect of institutions
on other (macroeconomic) variables, rather than the eﬀect of speciﬁc factors on institutional quality and
institutional change. Nevertheless, based on the insights from both the elite rivalry indicator preliminary
analysis in Sochirca & Veiga (2017) and the related literature, we identify a number of potential factors,
which may determine the observed elite rivalry level. These are: the level of development, foreign direct
investments, income inequality, checks and balances, proximity to historical frontiers, historical population
density, religious fractionalization, colonization experience and identity of colonizers, and legal origins of
company and commercial rules.
Regarding the level of development, various authors refer the importance of diﬀerent development di-
mensions for determining the quality of institutions. For example, Rodrik (2004) sustains that institutions
are a result of economic prosperity, and La Porta et al. (1999) show a positive relation between income and
institutional quality. The eﬀect of human capital on institutions was referred to in early works by Lipset
(1960) and North (1990). In particular, Lipset (1960) argued that human capital accumulation contributes
to eﬃcient policies, less violence, and more political stability. North (1990) sustained that the skills and
knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the
institutional framework. Similar views are supported in later studies by Glaeser et al. (2004), who provide
empirical evidence indicating that human capital positively aﬀects political institutions, and by Castello-
Climent (2008) who ﬁnds evidence that an educational improvement for the majority of the population leads
to both implementation and sustainability of democracies. More recently, Jones & Potrafke (2014) empiri-
cally assess whether higher human capital implies better institutions, and conclude that cognitive abilities are
robust predictors of overall institutional quality. Using both theoretical and empirical analyses, Fortunato
& Panizza (2015) study how the interaction between democracy and education aﬀects the quality of govern-
ment, and ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect of education is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in countries with
high levels of democracy. On the contrary, Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue that,
accounting for country heterogeneity, education has no eﬀect on democracy, and that there is no evidence of
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of human capital on institutions.
Various studies assess the impact of foreign direct investments (FDI) on various aspects of institutional
quality. For example, Larrain & Tavares (2007) study the empirical eﬀect of FDI inﬂows on corruption
and ﬁnd a strong negative impact, as FDI signiﬁcantly decreases corruption in the host country. Demir
& Hu (2016) explore the eﬀects of bilateral FDI ﬂows on institutional development gaps between countries
and whether such eﬀects are conditional on the direction of ﬂows. While this study ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
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convergence or divergence eﬀect of FDI ﬂows on the institutional distance between host and home countries, it
concludes that NorthSouth FDI ﬂows may positively inﬂuence institutional development in natural resource-
rich countries, and that this inﬂuence may be harmful for South-South ﬂows. Ahlquist & Prakash (2008)
examine the relationship between foreign direct investment and host countries' contracting institutions in
developing countries, and ﬁnd that FDI is more likely to inﬂuence institutions in host countries with a
greater dependence on foreign capital markets.
The negative eﬀect of natural resources rents, often referred to as the resource curse, has been emphasized
in related research. For example, Couttenier (2008) analyses the relation between natural resources and
institutions and ﬁnds that more abundant natural resources lead to lower quality institutions, due to an
increased expected proﬁtability of rent-seeking. Other researchers consider the natural resources dependence
as a decisive factor that decreases institutional quality and has a negative impact on growth (see, for example,
Isham & Busby, 2005, Boschini & Roine 2007and Sala-i Martin & Subramanian, 2003). Similarly, Acemoglu
(2009) argues that the political struggle between the political elite and other political groups can be aggravated
by the presence of natural resources rents, available only to the political group in power.
As regards income inequality, the related literature refers its negative eﬀect on institutional quality and
development. For example, Easterly (2007) ﬁnds that inequality causes underdevelopment, as it acts as a
large and statistically signiﬁcant barrier to prosperity, good quality institutions and high schooling. Chong
& Galdstein (2007) present a model in which inequality and institutions are dynamically interdependent and
use empirical tests to show a double causality between institutional strength and lower inequality. Empirical
results in Kotschy & Sunde (2017) show that excessive inequality reduces the eﬃciency and quality of economic
and political institutions, disabling the implementation of good institutional environments. Engermann &
Sokoloﬀ (2006) argue that societies with higher inequality levels tend to build ineﬃcient institutions, which
will further increase inequality, and conclude on the existence of a vicious cycle between income inequality
and ineﬃcient institutions.
Although Acemoglu (2009) does not consider a democratic regime as a guarantee of absence of elite rivalry,
in general, democratic states do have better institutions, and several authors sustain that there is a positive
relation between democracy and good institutions. For example, Meon & Sekkat (2016) ﬁnd that both
partial and full democratic transitions improve institutional outcomes and speciﬁc institutional features, and
Islam & Montenegro (2002) ﬁnd that checks and balances are positively associated with institutional quality.
Fortunato & Panizza (2015) ﬁnd a positive correlation between democracy and the quality of government
in countries with high levels of education; Rodrik (2000) sustains that democracy is a meta-institution for
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building good quality institutions.
Using spatial lag models to test for the impact of institutional quality in neighboring countries on the qual-
ity of domestic institutions, Faber & Gerritse (2009) analyze the inﬂuence of exposure and relative location
on the quality of local institutions, and ﬁnd that both have a signiﬁcant positive impact. Similarly, Kelejian
et al. (2013) consider spatial spillovers between countries in the development of institutions and ﬁnd that
institutional quality in one country is aﬀected by that of another country. Moreover, their empirical results
show that such spillover eﬀects not only spread between all bordering countries, but also to considerably
greater distances. More generally, Ashraf & Galor (2013) refer that spatial proximity to global and regional
technological frontiers not only facilitates the diﬀusion of new technologies, but also implies sociocultural and
geopolitical inﬂuences among countries.
Historical population density has been considered an important factor inﬂuencing institutional develop-
ment since the colonial times. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) refer
that, although throughout history population density has been positively correlated with contemporaneous
income per capita, among former colonies the relation is inverted. The authors argue that densely inhabited
colonies were more attractive for exploitation and less attractive for settlement. This motivated creating or
maintaining extractive institutions to facilitate the exploitation of resources and the collection of tax revenue.
On the contrary, colonies with lower population density prospered only when incentives and a broader set of
rights were given to European settlers, which promoted the creation of better institutions. Thus, during the
colonization period, population density inﬂuenced the strategy of institutional development and the quality
of the resulting institutions.
Regarding religion, Basten & Betz (2011) explore its eﬀect on politics and the economy, ﬁnding that
religion can signiﬁcantly deﬁne people's political preferences, with far-ranging implications for the choice of
political institutions. Focusing on redistribution in the United States, Guiso et al. (2006) show that diﬀerences
in redistribution preferences are associated with diﬀerent religious aﬃliations and ethnic background, which
actually aﬀect the U.S. state-level ﬁscal policy.
Colonization experience and the identity of colonizing countries have been also considered as factors
historically determining the type of a country's institutions. Studies by Acemoglu et al. (2001)and Acemoglu
& Robinson (2012) show that diﬀerent types of colonization policies create diﬀerent sets of political and
economic institutions, which are time-persistent. Distinguishing between colonization conditions and the
identity of colonizer, Bennett et al. (2017) ﬁnd that the impact of settlement conditions on institutional
development is much stronger among former British colonies than colonies of the other major European
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colonizers.
Finally, studying the inﬂuence of legal systems on the rule of law, Joireman (2004) ﬁnds that, in colonized
countries, the adoption of the English common law system provides more eﬃcient legal institutions than the
adoption of other forms of civil law. With a more general approach, La Porta et al. (2008) conduct an overview
of an extensive body of research on the relation between historical legal origins and rules and regulations
of a country, and conclude that diﬀerences in legal origins have signiﬁcant consequences for the legal and
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes. Similarly, the empirical ﬁndings in
Amin & Haidar (2012) suggest that diﬀerent legal traditions in fact imply diﬀerent institutional preferences
as regards private freedom and state control, strength of the judicial system, and overall governance quality.
Table 1 below brieﬂy describes the variables collected to reﬂect each of the above-referred potential
determining factors of elite rivalry.
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Table 1: Potential determining factors of elite rivalry
Factor Source Description
GDP per capita Penn World Tables 9 Expenditure-side real GDP per capita (at chained PPPs)
used to compare relative living standards.
Human Capital Index Penn World Tables 9 A human capital index, based on the years of schooling and
returns to education.
Foreign Direct
Investment
World Bank Investments reﬂecting a lasting interest by a foreign direct
investor; the lasting interest implies the existence of a
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the
direct investment enterprise and a signiﬁcant degree of
inﬂuence on the management of the enterprise (expressed
as a share of GDP).
Gini index World Income
Inequality Database
(WIID)
Gini Index, as a measure of the income distribution of a
population.
Checks and balances DPI (Database of
Political Institutions)
A composite indicator of institutionalized democracy
evaluated by openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, constraints on chief executive, and
competitiveness of participation.
Population density in
1500 A.D.
Ashraf & Galor (2013) Population density in 1500 A.D. at the country level for
regions deﬁned by contemporary national borders.
Frontier distance in
1500 A.D.
Ashraf & Galor (2013) The great circle distance, measured in km, from a country's
capital city to the closest regional technological frontier
(given by the most populous city belonging to a civilization
or sociopolitical entity, from each of Africa, Europe, Asia,
and the Americas) in the year 1500 A.D..
Religious fragmentation World Religion
Dataset
Eﬀective number of religions based on religious shares in
the population.
Natural resources rents World Bank Sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and
soft), mineral rents, and forest rents (expressed as a share
of GDP).
Colonization experience Wikipedia Dummy variable assuming value 1 if a country has been
colonized and 0 otherwise.
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3 Empirical analysis
In this section we check for empirical evidence concerning the potential determining factors (listed in
Table 1) of elite rivalry levels across countries. In particular, we will perform a set of regressions to assess
if and how the elite rivalry level is inﬂuenced by the variables identiﬁed in the previous section, i.e. GDP
per capita, human capital index, foreign direct investment, Gini index, checks and balances, proximity to
historical frontiers, historical population density, religious fragmentation, natural resources rents, colonization
experience, colonizers' identity, and legal origins of company and commercial rules of a country.5
3.1 Elite rivalry level - determining factors
In order to assess the inﬂuence of the selected variables on the elite rivalry level, we use cross-sectional
data6 and estimate by OLS several linear regressions based on the following model:
ERi = c+ βXi + εi (1)
where ERi denotes the elite rivalry indicator for country i, εi,t is the usual error term and the vector Xi
includes the mean values of the variables considered as determining factors of elite rivalry for each country i
(presented above in Table 1).
We estimate a set of ﬁve regressions. The ﬁrst regression - baseline regression - estimates model (1) with
the explanatory variables of Table 1, using contemporary values, both for the dependent and explanatory
variables, calculated as simple means for the period 1984-2012, for a sample of 108 countries. In the second
and third regressions, we additionally check if diﬀerences in the identity of the colonizing countries and in the
business framework legal characteristics have a signiﬁcant impact on elite rivalry. Concretely, in the second
regression we replace the variable Colonization experience by a set of dummy variables indicating the iden-
tities of the colonizing countries (i.e. England, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland and Other colonizers),
and, in the third regression, we add to the baseline regression a set of dummies identifying the legal origins
of company and commercial rules (UK, France, Germany, Scandinavia and Socialist countries), as additional
institutional quality controls.7 The fourth regression assesses the contemporary impact of the baseline ex-
planatory variables on the elite rivalry level in a restricted-period sample, considering the mean values for
5The selected variables' descriptive statistics and correlations are summarized in Appendix B.
6We use cross-section data because most of the variation of the elite rivalry indicator is cross-sectional (the between variation,
0.83, is considerably higher than the within variation, 0.37) and, in addition, several of our explanatory variables are constant
or highly persistent over time, which would generate problems of collinearity in panel data models that accounted for country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
7The data on the colonizer identities were collected from Wikipedia and data on the legal origins were taken from Ashraf &
Galor (2013).
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the years between 1990 and 2008.8 The ﬁfth regression uses initial values for the explanatory variables,
given by their simple means for the 4-year period of 1995-1998, and mean values for the dependent variable
across the rest of the period under analysis, that is, 1999-2012. For all the regressions, we conduct diagnostic
testing by performing the usual heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity (VIF) tests. The estimation results
are reported in Table 2:
8We exclude earlier years with less observations (1984-1989) and years since the beginning of the last international ﬁnancial
crisis (2009-2012).
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Table 2: Estimation results
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP per capita 2.51e-05***
(4.398)
2.53e-05***
(4.340)
2.44e-05***
(3.244)
3.01e-05***
(5.161)
3.66e-05***
(5.088)
Human capital index 0.320***
(3.118)
0.347***
(2.917)
0.326**
(2.518)
0.279**
(2.628)
0.250*
(1.690)
Foreign direct investments
(% of GDP)
0.00519
(0.537)
0.00284
(0.311)
0.00638
(0.570)
0.0166
(1.049)
0.00295
(0.103)
Gini index 0.00319
(0.509)
-0.000105
(-0.0132)
0.00462
(0.618)
0.00800
(1.474)
-0.00411
(-0.691)
Checks and balances 0.149***
(4.175)
0.133***
(3.500)
0.147***
(4.016)
0.117***
(4.212)
0.0655**
(2.494)
Frontier distance
(1500 AD)
0.00471*
(1.695)
0.00528*
(1.898)
0.00495*
(1.737)
0.00357
(1.374)
0.000356
(0.115)
Population density (1500
AD)
-0.00634
(-1.420)
-0.00511
(-1.158)
-0.00463
(-0.785)
-0.00773*
(-1.900)
-0.00974**
(-2.110)
Religious fragmentation 0.000704
(0.0182)
0.00899
(0.211)
0.0145
(0.338)
-0.0142
(-0.378)
0.0238
(0.564)
Natural resources rents
(% of GDP)
-0.0202***
(-4.869)
-0.0213***
(-5.272)
-0.0205***
(-4.764)
-0.0184***
(-4.815)
-0.0172***
(-2.774)
Colonization experience -0.294**
(-2.375)
- -0.255*
(-1.923)
-0.300***
(-2.773)
-0.128
(-0.948)
Colonizer_England - -0.309**
(-2.057)
- - -
Colonizer_Spain - -0.174
(-1.036)
- - -
Colonizer_Portugal - 0.145
(0.553)
- - -
Colonizer_France - -0.237
(-1.364)
- - -
Colonizer_Holland - -0.675***
(-4.006)
- - -
Other colonizers - 0.0615
(0.331)
- - -
Legal origin (UK) - - -0.0923
(-0.495)
- -
Legal origin (France) - - -0.0194
(-0.119)
- -
Legal origin (Germany) - - 0.0363
(0.146)
- -
Legal origin (Scandinavia) - - 0.139
(0.709)
- -
Constant -1.343***
(-3.730)
-1.282***
(-2.789)
-1.449***
(-3.634)
-1.301***
(-3.697)
-0.623
(-1.494)
Number of observations 108 108 108 105 92
Adjusted R-squared 0.803 0.803 0.796 0.809 0.766
Mean VIF 2.08 2.26 2.94 2.02 2.12
Periods for which averages are calculated:
Dependent variable 1984-2012 1984-2012 1984-2012 1990-2008 1999-2012
Explanatory variables 1984-2012 1984-2012 1984-2012 1990-2008 1995-1998
Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares with White robust standard errors;
Socialist legal origin is the reference category in the regression reported in column (3);
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denotes the level of signiﬁcance of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t-statistics are reported in brackets.
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The results presented in column (1) for the baseline regression show that GDP per capita, human capital,
the system of checks and balances, natural resources rents and colonization experience are strong determinants
of the elite rivalry level. All these variables are statistically signiﬁcant at 1% or 5%, and have the expected
signs. More speciﬁcally, higher income per capita, more years of schooling and higher returns to education,
and a more eﬃcient system of checks and balances contribute to reducing elite rivalry (corresponding to
higher indicator values). On the contrary, higher levels of elite rivalry (corresponding to lower indicator
values) are found in countries that have been colonized in the past and in countries with high shares of
natural resources rents in GDP. These results suggest that elite rivalry is a rather complex phenomenon, as
it is strongly inﬂuenced by economic, political, and historical factors. Regarding the proximity to historical
frontiers, it has a marginally signiﬁcant (at 10%) eﬀect on elite rivalry, implying that the institutional quality
in one country is moderately aﬀected by that of a neighboring country, and that greater distance contributes
to avoiding (negative) external inﬂuences. Finally, income inequality, foreign direct investments, historical
population density, and religious fragmentation do not appear signiﬁcant in explaining diﬀerences in the
observed elite rivalry levels across countries.
These results are generally conﬁrmed in regressions (2)-(5), as the signiﬁcant variables from the baseline
regression maintain their coeﬃcients' signs and levels of signiﬁcance, and the remaining variables continue
statistically insigniﬁcant.9 In addition, the results reported in Column (2) show that the magnitude of the
impact of colonization experience on a country's level of elite rivalry varies according to the identity of its
colonizer. For example, the average elite rivalry indicator values are lower by 0.309 and 0.675 (implying
greater elite rivalry) in countries colonized by England (at 5%) and Holland (at 1%), respectively, compared
to the average level of elite rivalry in countries that have not been colonized. Finally, the coeﬃcients of the
legal origins of company and commercial rules, reported in Column (3), do not appear statistically signiﬁcant
in determining the elite rivalry levels.
3.2 Transmission channels
Based on the empirical evidence obtained from the analysis in the previous section, we perform several
regressions in order to identify the main transmission channels through which the selected variables may
aﬀect elite rivalry. Given that the elite rivalry indicator in Sochirca & Veiga (2017) includes four components,
namely legal system & property rights, eﬀectiveness of legislature, general regime eﬀects and political risk,
each representing speciﬁc institutional features, we can consider them as potential transmission channels
9The only exceptions are: variable Population density (1500AD), which becomes signiﬁcant, and variable
Frontier distance (1500AD), which becomes insigniﬁcant, in regressions (4)-(5); variable Colonization experience, which be-
comes insigniﬁcant in regression (5).
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through which the previously identiﬁed determining factors may act to inﬂuence the elite rivalry level. The
designations of the ﬁrst two channels give a clear idea about their nature, i.e. integrity of the legal system,
protection of property rights and eﬀectiveness of legislature; the other two channels  political risk and
general regime eﬀects  relate to overall institutional strength, quality of bureaucracy and general authority
patterns.10
To study the transmission channels, we include in separate regressions one of the elite rivalry components
as the dependent variable and the factors considered in the baseline regression as explanatory variables. Thus,
we perform four diﬀerent regressions, one for each component of the elite rivalry indicator:
ERcomponenti = c+ βFi + εi (2)
where ERcomponenti denotes the elite rivalry component for country i, εi,t is the usual error term and
the vector Fi includes the nine independent variables considered in the baseline regression in Section 3.
We consider the sample with contemporary values, both for the dependent and explanatory variables,
calculated as the averages between the years of 1984 to 2012, as in the baseline regression of the previous
section. In order to determine the relative contribution of each variable in each transmission channel, we
standardize all variables of equation (2).11 The estimation results are presented in Table 3:
10For more details see Sochirca & Veiga (2017).
11To standardize variables, we apply the usual procedure of subtracting the variable's mean and dividing by its standard error.
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Table 3: Transmission channels
Explanatory variables /
Transmission channels
Legal system &
property rights
Eﬀectiveness of
legislature
General
regime eﬀects
Political risk
GDP per capita 0.779***
(10.62)
0.296**
(2.376)
0.00418
(0.0431)
0.562***
(4.665)
Human capital index 0.0689
(0.835)
0.293***
(2.879)
0.333***
(4.049)
0.181**
(2.379)
Foreign direct investments
(% of GDP)
-0.0179
(-0.202)
-0.0307
(-0.450)
0.0677
(1.195)
0.0562
(0.808)
Gini index -0.110
(-1.298)
0.190***
(2.662)
0.206***
(2.789)
-0.132
(-1.542)
Checks and balances 0.0101
(0.131)
0.291***
(3.662)
0.496***
(6.071)
0.0275
(0.444)
Frontier distance (1500 AD) 0.113*
(1.661)
0.0754
(0.897)
0.0989
(1.372)
0.0854
(1.347)
Population density (1500
AD)
-0.113**
(-2.028)
-0.00640
(-0.113)
-0.0161
(-0.374)
-0.0491
(-1.005)
Religious fragmentation 0.118***
(2.655)
-0.0657
(-0.984)
-0.106**
(-2.054)
0.0491
(1.239)
Natural resources rents
(% of GDP)
-0.308***
(-6.759)
-0.213**
(-2.554)
-0.244***
(-3.675)
-0.296***
(-4.379)
Colonization experience -0.171**
(-2.450)
-0.132
(-1.449)
-0.0808
(-0.936)
-0.0758
(-1.212)
Number of observations 108 107 108 108
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.644 0.720 0.792
Mean VIF 2.08 2.09 2.08 2.08
Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares with White robust standard errors; Sample period 1984-2012;
All variables have been previously standardized;
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denotes the level of signiﬁcance of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively; t-statistics are reported in brackets.
The results in Table 3 show that all elite rivalry components act as important transmission channels
for the impacts of the ﬁve variables found highly signiﬁcant in the baseline regression in column (1) of
Table 2 (that is, GDP per capita, Human capital index, Checks and balances, Natural resources rents, and
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Colonization experience). More speciﬁcally, the eﬀect of variable GDP per capita is highly signiﬁcant in
the Legal system & property rights and Political risk channels, and the eﬀect of variable Checks and balances
is highly signiﬁcant in the Eﬀectiveness of legislature and General regime eﬀects channels, all at 1% of
signiﬁcance. Moreover, the eﬀects of variables Human capital, GDP per capita and Natural resources rents
are present in most or all channels, at 1% and 5% of signiﬁcance. Thus, while the income level, human capital
and rents received from natural resources aﬀect practically all aspects of elite rivalry, the system of checks
and balances and colonization experience clearly act on speciﬁc dimensions: the former strongly determines
legislative eﬀectiveness and regime authority patterns, and the latter essentially aﬀects legal system integrity
and the protection of property rights.
Our next step is to quantify the relative eﬀect for each of the ﬁve signiﬁcant variables. For that, we use
the estimated coeﬃcient of each variable reported in Table 3, together with the weights of each of the elite
rivalry components (obtained from the factor analysis performed for constructing the elite rivalry indicator
in Sochirca & Veiga (2017), as explained in Section2). Table 4 below summarizes the calculated eﬀects:
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Table 4: Quantiﬁed eﬀects on elite rivalry
Explanatory variables //
Transmission channels
(1)
Legal system
& property
rights
(2)
Eﬀectiveness
of
legislature
(3)
General
regime
eﬀects
(4)
Political
risk
(5)
% of total
eﬀect on elite
rivalry, by
factor
GDP per
capita
Estimated coeﬃcient
Eﬀect on elite rivalry
Total eﬀect, by channel
0,779***
0,286002
55,34%
0,296**
0,070415
13,63 %
0,00418
0,000932
0,18%
0,562***
0,159423
30,85%
28,07%
Human
capital index
Estimated coeﬃcient
Eﬀect on elite rivalry
Total eﬀect, by channel
0,0689
0,025296
11,47%
0,293***
0,069702
31,60%
0,333***
0,074259
33,66%
0,181**
0,051344
23,28%
11,98%
Checks and
balances
Estimated coeﬃcient
Eﬀect on elite rivalry
Total eﬀect, by channel
0,0101
0,003708
1,94%
0,291***
0,069226
36,18%
0,496***
0,110608
57,81%
0,0275
0,007801
4,08%
10,39%
Natural
resources
rents
(% of GDP)
Estimated coeﬃcient
Eﬀect on elite rivalry
Total eﬀect, by channel
0,308***
0,113079
37,43%
0,213**
0,050671
16,77%
0,244***
0,054412
18,01 %
0,296***
0,083966
27,79%
16,41%
Colonization
experience
Estimated coeﬃcient
Eﬀect on elite rivalry
Total eﬀect, by channel
0,171**
0,062781
46,96%
0,132
0,031401
23,49%
0,0808
0,018018
13,48 %
0,0758
0,021502
16,08%
7,26%
Estimated coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels are obtained from Table 3;
The eﬀect of each variable on elite rivalry was obtained by multiplying its estimated coeﬃcient by the following factor scores of each
channel (as predicted in the factor analysis):
legal system & property rights - 0.36714, eﬀectiveness of legislature - 0.23789, general regime eﬀects - 0.223 and political risk -
0.28367;
The reported percentages are calculated based on the regression (2) with nine explanatory variables, but we only present the calculated
eﬀects for the baseline signiﬁcant variables (see column (1) of Table (2));
All the percentages were calculated considering the absolute values of the estimated coeﬃcients.
As we can see from the values presented in the last column, the ﬁve signiﬁcant determining factors account
for three quarters of the total eﬀect of all nine variables. The strongest inﬂuence on the elite rivalry level
comes from GDP per capita, responsible for around one third of the total eﬀect, followed by natural resources
rents and human capital, with around 16% and 12%, respectively (see Column (5)). We can also see that
variables GDP per capita and Natural resources rents act primarily through the Legal system&property
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rights and political risk channels (accounting for about 85% and 65%, respectively, of their total eﬀects
through all channels), while variables Human capital index and Checks and balances act mostly through
the Eﬀectiveness of legislature and General regime eﬀects channels (accounting for around 65% and 95%
respectively, of their total eﬀects through all channels). Regarding the variable Colonization experience, its
strongest inﬂuence is transmitted through the Legal system&property rights channel (almost 50% of its total
eﬀect on elite rivalry) and to a lesser extent through the Eﬀectiveness of legislature channel (almost 25% of
its total eﬀect).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have empirically examined the key determining factors of elite rivalry and their main channels
of transmission, contributing to the sparse literature on the topic. Compared to previous related studies,
we perform an enriched analysis on the key determinants of institutions by employing elite rivalry as a new
institutional quality measure for a large sample of countries, as well as adding foreign direct investment and
frontier distance as potential new determining factors, which, although reported important in the related
literature, have not been considered in previous studies.
Our empirical results clearly indicate that the income level, human capital, the system of checks and
balances, natural resources rents, and colonization experience are strong determinants of the observed elite
rivalry levels. Concretely, while the ﬁrst three factors contribute to reducing elite rivalry, the last two factors
contribute to aggravate it. Additionally, our results indicate that a country's level of elite rivalry can be also
inﬂuenced by the identity of its colonizer, which, in line with the estimated negative impact of colonization
experience and (to a less signiﬁcant, but still relevant eﬀect) proximity to historical frontiers, brings further
support to the empirical relation between speciﬁc external inﬂuences and the level of elite rivalry. Finally,
our results suggest that foreign direct investment, income inequality, historical population density, and the
legal origins of company and commercial rules do not have a signiﬁcant determining eﬀect on the elite rivalry
level.
Regarding the transmission channels, our empirical analysis shows that all elite rivalry components act as
important channels for transmitting the eﬀects of the ﬁve determining factors. The quantiﬁcation of eﬀects
by factor across all channels showed that the level of income is responsible for about one third of the overall
eﬀect, followed by natural resources rents and human capital, thus accounting together for about two thirds
of the overall eﬀect on the observed elite rivalry levels.
In sum, the empirical results obtained in this work indicate that adopting a better institutional model can
18
in fact reduce the level of elite rivalry in the long run, and that external inﬂuences can help determine the
quality of the institutions adopted. Our empirical ﬁndings on the key determining factors of elite rivalry also
suggest that it is a complex phenomenon deserving further research, as it is strongly inﬂuenced by economic,
political, and historical factors.
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Appendix A
Table 5: Composition of the Elite Rivalry Indicator
ER components Description Component
Weight
Legal system & property
rights (Economic Freedom
of the World)
Nine sub-components reﬂecting the judicial
independence and impartial courts, integrity of the legal
system, legal enforcement of contracts, military
interference in rule of law and politics, protection of
property rights, regulatory restrictions, reliability of
police, business costs of crime.
0.36714
Eﬀectiveness of legislature
(Cross National Time
Series)
Ordinal-scaled data on legislative processes, coded as
eﬀective, partly eﬀective, largely ineﬀective, or no
legislature.
0.23789
General regime eﬀects
(POLITY IV)
General regime eﬀects (ranging from democracy to
autocracy) evaluated in terms of openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on
chief executive, and regulation and competitiveness of
participation.
0.223
Political risk
(International Country Risk
Guide)
Five (out of twelve) factors, termed political risk
components, such as: government's ability to carry out
its declared programs and its ability to stay in oﬃce;
strength of the legal system and public observance of
the law; degree of government responsiveness to its
people; overall institutional strength and bureaucracy
quality.
0.28367
Note: Factor analysis was employed for identifying the elite rivalry components and their respective weights, see Sochirca & Veiga
(2017).
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Appendix B
Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per capita 122 13998.77 14990.45 713.1891 86105.73
Human capital index 117 2.341193 0.6670116 1.08715 3.559204
Foreign direct investment
(% of GDP)
123 3.663361 4.647385 -6.203491 41.03395
Gini index 118 40.39022 9.010059 24.59931 64.5725
Checks and balances 123 2.91722 1.378894 1 8.206897
Frontier distance (1500 AD) 120 23.87618 18.69328 0 108.0218
Population density (1500 AD) 120 6.513536 9.297991 0. 0219937 46.63923
Religious fragmentation 124 2.338622 1.185366 0.8711772 5.426222
Natural resources rents
(% of GDP)
123 10.06412 12.43427 0.0014029 54.35196
Colonization experience 124 0.6451613 0.4804055 0 1
Table 7: Correlation matrix
Variables
correla-
tions
Elite
rivalry
GDP
per
capita
Human
capital
index
Foreign
direct
investment
Gini
index
Checks
and
balances
Frontier
distance
Popul.
density
Religious
fragm.
Natural
resources
rents
Coloniz.
experi-
ence
Elite rivalry 1.0000 - - - - - - - - - -
GDP per
capita
0.7459 1.0000 - - - - - - - - -
Human
capital
index
0.7921 0.6864 1.0000 - - - - - - - -
Foreign
direct
investment
0.2772 0.4062 0.2016 1.0000 - - - - - - -
Gini index -0.4387 -0.4880 -0.5095 -0.2135 1.0000 - - - - - -
Checks and
balances
0.6473 0.4517 0.5530 0.1227 -0.2937 1.0000 - - - - -
Frontier
distance
-0.1679 -0.1934 -0.2246 -0.1356 0.3719 -0.1577 1.0000 - - - -
Popul.
density
0.3968 0.4201 0.3221 0.2694 -0.5438 0.4322 -0.3368 1.0000 - - -
Religious
fragment.
-0.0382 0.0003 -0.0195 0.0414 0.0963 -0.1344 0.5775 -0.1764 1.0000 - -
Natural
resources
rents
-0.5006 -0.1690 -0.3229 -0.0550 0.1291 -0.3949 0.1785 -0.3316 0.1845 1.0000 -
Colonization
experience
-0.4922 -0.3938 -0.5763 -0.1717 0.6648 -0.2407 0.5235 -0.4441 0.2036 0.2344 1.0000
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